Abstract This paper is concerned with a new type of differential game problems of forwardbackward stochastic systems. There are three distinguishing features: Firstly, our game systems are forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations, which is a class of more general game systems than other forward-backward stochastic game systems without doubly stochastic terms; Secondly, forward equations are directly related to backward equations at initial time, not terminal time; Thirdly, the admissible control is required to be adapted to a sub-information of the full information generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We give a necessary and a sufficient conditions for both an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum games and a saddle point of zero-sum games. Finally, we work out an example of linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential games to illustrate the theoretical applications. Applying some stochastic filtering techniques, we obtain the explicit expression of the equilibrium point.
Introduction
Game theory is a useful tool which helps us understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. Stochastic differential game problems also attract more and more research attentions, and are used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. When we study stochastic differential games of backward doubly stochastic differential equations (BDSDEs, for short), doubly stochastic Hamiltonian systems with boundary conditions appear naturally whose dynamics are described by initial coupled forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations (FBDSDEs, for short). To illustrate this, we introduce an example of linear quadratic (LQ, for short) nonzero-sum differential games of BDSDEs with partial information which motivates us to initiate a study of stochastic differential games of initial coupled FBDSDEs with partial information. We now explain this in more detail.
Let T be a fixed constant and Ω, F , P be a complete filtered probability space, on which two mutually independent standard Brownian motions B(·) ∈ R l and W (·) ∈ R d are defined.
Let N denote the class of P -null sets of F. For each t ∈ [0, T ], we define
where F W t = N ∨ σ{W (r) − W (0) : 0 ≤ r ≤ t} and F B t,T = N ∨ σ{B(r) − B(t) : t ≤ r ≤ T }. Note that the set F t , t ∈ [0, T ] is neither increasing nor decreasing, so it does not constitute a filtration.
We denote by L where i = 1, 2, E t is an available sub-information of full information F t for players, i.e.
E t ⊆ F t , for all t.
For example, E t could be the δ-delayed information defined by We consider the following 1-dimensional linear BDSDE
and the performance criterion, for i = 1, 2,
where the integral with respect todB(t) is a "backward Itô integral" and the integral with respect to dW (t) is a standard forward Itô integral. These are two types of particular cases of the Itô-Skorohod integral (see Nualart and Pardoux [13] ). The extra noise {B(t)} can be considered some extra information that can not be detected in practice, such as in a derivative security market, but is valuable to the partial investors.
If we let A 2 , B 2 , C 2 , D 2 ≡ 0, then equation (1) is reduced to a general backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) of Pardoux-Peng's type (see Pardoux and Peng[16] ).
For simplicity, we assume temporarily that ξ ∈ L 2 T (Ω, R 1 ), all coefficients in (1) and (2) are
Our aim is to seek an equilibrium point (
We call it an LQ nonzero-sum differential game of BDSDE and denote it by Problem (LQNZB).
Applying Theorem 4.1 in Han et al. [4] , we conclude that the equilibrium point must satisfy the following form:
where (y i , z i ) (i = 1, 2) is the solution of the following initial coupled FBDSDE:
We see that the equation for Y (·) is backward (since it is given the final datum which is an F T -measurable random variable), the equation for y i (·) is forward (since it is given the initial datum which is directly related with the backward solution Y (·) at initial time). Further, the backward equation is "forward" with respect to the backward stochastic integraldB(t), as well as "backward" with respect to the forward stochastic integral dW (t); the coupled forward equation
is "backward" with respect to the backward stochastic integraldB(t), as well as "forward" with respect to the forward stochastic integral dW (t). Equation (4) is exactly the type of timesymmetric forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs, for short) introduced by Peng and Shi [19] . There is a small difference between equation (4) There is a few literature on differential games of BSDEs and FBSDEs. Yu and Ji [34] obtained an existence and uniqueness result for an initial coupled FBSDE under some monotone conditions, applied it to backward linear-quadratic nonzero-sum stochastic differential game problem and got the explicit form of a Nash equilibrium point. Wang and Yu [25] established a necessary and a sufficient conditions for an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum differential game of BSDEs and applied them to study a financial problem. Zhang [35] extended the result of Yu and Ji [34] to the case where BSDEs are driven by both Brownian motion and Poisson random measure. Wang and Yu [26] recently generalize the results of [25] to partial information differential games and obtain the corresponding maximum principle and verification theorem, and they also apply the theoretical results to study LQ differential games and financial problem. Yu [33] mainly studied the LQ optimal control and nonzero-sum differential game of FBSDE. Hui and Xiao [7] investigated differential games of FBSDEs, and established the maximum principle and verification theorem for both an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum cases and a saddle point of zero-sum cases. Meng [12] discussed the partial information zero-sum differential games of fully coupled FBSDEs.
Han et al. [4] investigated the optimal control for BDSDEs and obtain a stochastic maximum principle of the optimal control. In [19] , Peng and Shi established the existence and uniqueness results of terminal coupled FBDSDEs under certain monotonicity assumptions. Zhu et al. [37] relaxed the monotonicity assumptions and allowed the case of different dimensions between forward equations and backward equations, compared with the results in Peng and Shi [19] .
Zhang and Shi [36] However, none of the works mentioned above deals with differential games of initial coupled FBDSDEs with full information or partial information. In Section 2, we formulate the zero-sum and nonzero-sum games of initial-coupled FBDSDEs with partial information. In Section 3, we are devoted to proving a maximum principle and a verification theorem for both an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum games and a saddle point of zero-sum games. In Section 4, an example of a nonzero-sum differential game is worked out to illustrate theoretical applications. In terms of maximum principle and verification theorem, the explicit expression of an equilibrium point is obtained. Finally, we give some concluding remarks.
Formulation of the problem
We introduce the mappings
We assume moreover that f,f , g andḡ are continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z, Y, Z, 
There exists constants k > 0 and 0 < c < 1 such
In the following, we specify the problems of nonzero-sum and zero-sum differential games of forward-backward doubly stochastic systems, respectively. For simplicity, we denote them by Problem (NZSG) and Problem (ZSG), respectively.
Consider an FBDSDE
Under the assumption (H1), there exists a unique solution
∈ U 1 × U 2 (see Pardoux and Peng [17] ). In the case where equation (5) does not involve the term of backward Itô's integral, i.e.ḡ ≡ 0, f andf are independent of z v 1 ,v 2 , the game systems will be reduced to the initial coupled FBSDEs which has been studied by Xiao and Wang [30] . In the case where equation (5) does not involve the forward equation, i.e. f =f = φ ≡ 0, the game systems will be reduced to the BDSDEs which has been investigated by Han et al. [4] . In the case where equation (5) does not involve both the term of backward Itô's integral and the forward equation, the game systems will be reduced to the BSDEs which has been investigated by Wang and Yu [25, 26] and Yu and Ji [34] .
Consider a performance criterion
, and
with l(·,
We note that (6) and (7) are well posed. There are two players i 1 and i 2 . Player i 1 controls v 1 and Player i 2 controls v 2 .
) an open-loop equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG) (if it does exist). It is easy to see that the existence of an open-loop equilibrium point
(if it exists). In fact the existence of an open-loop saddle point implies
We shall verify this point in Theorem 3.5 (iii).
3 Differential games of FBDSDEs 3.1 Nonzero-sum case
is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG) with the trajectory y(·),
Notice that U i is convex, then for 0 ≤ ǫ, ρ ≤ 1, i = 1, 2,
For simplicity, we denote
define the processesŶ
and make the similar notations forf ,ḡ, l i ,ŷ i ,ẑ i ,Ẑ i , i = 1, 2. For i = 1, 2, we have the following variational equations:
Next, we define the generalized Hamiltonian function (5). We shall use the abbreviated notation H i (t) defined by
The adjoint equations are described by the following generalized stochastic Hamiltonian systems:
Then we have the following maximum principle for nonzero-sum differential games. (5) and (11) . Then it follows that
and
are true for any (v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , a.e. a.s.
is an equilibrium point, we have
Applying Itô's formula to p 1 (t),Ŷ 1 (t) and q 1 (t),ŷ 1 (t) , and integrating from 0 to T , we have
Substituting (15) and (16) into (14), for all v 1 ∈ U 1 such that
which implies that (12) is true. The result (13) can be proved by the same method as shown in proving (12) .
If the control process v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) is admissible adapted to the filtration F t , we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 (Maximum principle for full information nonzero-sum games) Suppose that E t = F t for all t. Let (H1) hold and u 1 (·), u 2 (·) be an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum differential games with the corresponding solutions x(·), y(·), z(·) and p i (·), q i (·), k i (·) of (5) and (11). Then it follows that
In what follows, we proceed to establish a verification theorem, also called a sufficient condition, for an equilibrium point. For this, we introduce an additional condition as follows: Let (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 be with the corresponding solutions (y, z, Y, Z) and (p i ,p i , q i ,q i ) of equations (5) and (11) . Supposê 
Moreover
Then (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG).
Proof : Let (v 1 (·), u 2 (·)) and (u 1 (·), v 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 with the corresponding solutions (y v 1 , z v 1 , (5). We define the following terms
and similar notations are made forf
By virtue of the concavity property of ϕ 1 and γ 1 , we have for ∀ v 1 (·) ∈ U 1
with
Applying Itô's formula to q 1 (t), y v 1 (t) − y(t) and p 1 (t), Y v 1 (t) − Y (t) ,
Substituting (22)- (24) into (21), it follows immediately that
Since v 1 −→ E H 1 t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), v 1 , u 2 (t), p 1 (t), q 1 (t),q 1 (t) E t is maximum for v 1 = u 1 and since v 1 (t), u 1 (t) are E t -measurable, we get
By the equality (19) and the concavity ofĤ 1 , we conclude that
for all v 1 (·) ∈ U 1 . Repeating the similar proceeding as shown in deriving (26), we can prove that
Based on the arguments above, (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG).
Corollary 3.2 (Verification theorem for full information nonzero-sum games)
Suppose that E t = F t for all t and that (H1), (H2) and (18) hold. Let (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 be with the corresponding solutions (y, z, Y, Z) and (p i ,p i , q i ,q i ) of equations (5) and (11). Moreover
is an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum differential games.
Zero-sum case
In this section, we consider zero-sum differential games of FBDSDEs. In fact, zero-sum games can be consider a special case of nonzero-sum games. By the maximum principle of nonzerosum games in Section 3.1, we can deduce the necessary conditions for a saddle point of zero-sum games. We shall detail this as follows.
is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG), we have
which implies that
Therefore, (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is also a saddle point of Problem (ZSG).
We define a new Hamiltonian function
Let (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 with the solution y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·) of equation (5). We shall use the abbreviated notation H(t) defined by
H(t) ≡ H t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u 1 (t), u 2 (t), p(t),p(t), q(t),q(t) .
Based on the above arguments, we can directly derive the following maximum principle for zero-sum games. (5) and (29), respectively. Then it follows that
is an equilibrium point (resp. a saddle point) of nonzero-sum (resp. zero-sum) differential games and u 1 (t), u 2 (t) is an interior point of U 1 × U 2 a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ], then the inequalities in Theorem 3.1 (resp. Theorem 3.3) are equivalent to the following equations
We note that Theorem 3.3 gives a globally necessary condition for a saddle point of zerosum games. In the following, we begin to present a corresponding locally necessary condition for Problem (ZSG).
We firstly give the following assumptions.
(H3) For all t, τ such that 0 ≤ t < t+τ ≤ T, all bounded E t -measurable α 1 , α 2 , and for s ∈ [0, T ],
belong to U 1 and U 2 . For given u 1 , β 1 ∈ U 1 and u 2 , β 2 ∈ U 2 , there exists δ > 0 such that
where β 1 and β 2 are bounded, and ǫ, ρ ∈ (−δ, δ).
Theorem 3.4 (Local maximum principle for zero-sum games) Let (H1) and (H3) hold.
equations (5) and (29), respectively. Further, u 1 (·), u 2 (·) is a directional critical point for
, in the sense that, for all bounded β 1 ∈ U 1 and β 2 ∈ U 2 , there exists δ > 0 such that u 1 + ǫβ 1 ∈ U 1 and u 2 + ρβ 2 ∈ U 2 , and h(ǫ, ρ) .
has a critical point at (0, 0), for all ǫ, ρ ∈ (−δ, δ), i.e.
Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Proof: Since the remaining case can be dealt with by the similar proceeding, we only prove
As shown in Theorem 3.1, applying Itô's formula to p(t),Ŷ 1 (t) and q(t),ŷ 1 (t) , integrating from 0 to T , and substituting them into (33), we have
In terms of assumption (H3) and equality (34), we further derive that
Differentiating with respect to τ at τ = 0, it yields that
Since equality (35) holds for all bounded E t -measurable β 1j , we conclude that
Repeating the similar proceeding by differentiating the function h(0, ρ) with respect to ρ, we
The proof is completed.
In the sequel, we give a verification theorem for a saddle point of zero-sum games. where M is a non-zero constant matrix with order n × m. Let (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 with the solutions (y, z, Y, Z) and (p,p, q,q) to equations (5) and (29), respectively. Suppose that the
Hamiltonian function H satisfies the following conditional mini-maximum principle:
(i)Assume that both ϕ and γ are concave, and
exists for all (t, a, b, c) ∈ [0, T ] × R n × R m × R m×d , and is concave in (a, b, c). Then we have
(ii)Assume that both ϕ and γ are convex, and (a, b, c) . Then we have
and is convex in
(iii) If both (i) and (ii) are true, then (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is a saddle point which implies
Proof : (i) Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can the following:
Furthermore sup which imply that
Combining (38) and (39), we have sup 
An example on a nonzero-sum game
In this section, an example of nonzero-sum differential games of FBSDEs is worked out to illustrate our theoretical result. Firstly, by applying the maximum principle (see Theorem 3.1),
we find a candidate equilibrium point. Then we obtain the explicit expression of the candidate equilibrium point by virtue of certain filtering techniques of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. Finally, using the verification theorem of an equilibrium point (see Theorem 3.2), we confirm that it is indeed an equilibrium point.
Example: Consider the system of FBDSDE
with the performance criterion, for i = 1, 2,
Here, we assume that all the coefficients in (40) and (41) are bounded and deterministic functions of t, e i1 , · · · , e i6 are symmetric nonnegative definite, and e i7 is symmetric uniformly positive definite. The set of admissible controls is defined by
and satisfies
Where
For simplicity, we only deal with the case of 1-dimensional coefficients. Our problem is to find
Solving: We find the equilibrium point by three steps.
(i) Seek candidate equilibrium points.
Letq i (t) denote the filtering of q i (·) with respect to E t , i.e.q i (t) = E q i (t) E t . The similar notations are made forq i (t),p i (t),p i (t), · · · , i = 1, 2.
Applying the maximum principle for nonzero-sum games (Theorem 3.1), we confirm that the candidate equilibrium points must satisfy the following form:
where
, is the solution of the adjoint FBDSDE:
and y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·) is the solution of the following equation:
(ii) Optimal filtering with the sub-information E t = N ∨ σ W (r); 0 ≤ r ≤ t .
Equation (46) together with (47) constitutes a triple dimensional FBDSDE. In order to find the explicit expression of the candidate equilibrium point, we need to compute the optimal filters p 1 (·) andp 2 (·) of p 1 (·) and p 1 (·). Applying the filtering result derived by Xiong ([31], Lemma 5.4) to (46) and (47) under the available sub-information E t = N ∨ σ W (r); 0 ≤ r ≤ t , we conclude thatp 1 (·) andp 2 (·) satisfy the following triple dimensional FBSDE: Xiong [31] ). Now, we obtain an explicit candidate equilibrium point for the foregoing LQ nonzerosum differential game.
(iii) Verify that u 1 (·), u 2 (·) denoted by (45) is indeed an equilibrium point.
We can check that the system (40) and performance criterion (41) satisfy the assumptions (H1) and (H2), the Hamiltonian H i (i = 1, 2) denoted by (44) satisfies the conditions (18) (19) (20) .
Then, from Theorem 3.2, we conclude that u 1 (·), u 2 (·) denoted by (45) is indeed an equilibrium point.
Conclusion
We are concerned with a new type of stochastic differential game problems of FBDSDEs. There are two distinguishing features: One is that game systems are initial coupled; The other one is that differential games is under partial information. We established a maximum principle and a verification theorem, also called a necessary condition and a sufficient condition, for an equilibrium point of partial information nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. Zerosum games can be considered as a particular case of nonzero-sum games, so we also gave the corresponding conditions for a saddle point of zero-sum stochastic differential games. Finally, we worked out an LQ example and gave the explicit expression of an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum differential games.
It is worth pointing out that game system of FBDSDE covers many cases as its particular case. If we drop its the terms of backward Itô's integral or forward equation or both them , FBDSDE can be reduced to FBSDE or BDSDE or BSDE. Moreover, if we suppose that E t = F t for all t ∈ [0, T ], all the results are reduced to the case of full information. In addition, stochastic control problems can be regarded as zero-sum stochastic differential games with only one player.
Then, our results are a partial extension to Xiao and Wang [30] for optimal control of FBSDEs with partial information, Han et al. [4] for optimal control of BDSDEs with full information, Huang et al. [6] for optimal control of BSDEs with partial information, Wang Finally, since there are many partial information optimization and game problems in finance and economics, we hope that the results have applications in these areas.
